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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, there were 5906 accidents involving motorcycles in Florida,
ninety percent of which involved bodily injury.' During 1992, in Broward
County alone, there were 538 motorcycle accidents, eleven resulting in
fatalities and 485 resulting in injury.2 Comparatively, there was a sixty-five
percent injury rate for private passenger automobile accidents over the same
period in Broward County.' Moreover, injuries in motorcycle accidents are
1. Letter from Skip Hood, Management Review Specialist, State of Florida Department
of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, to Denise Tamir, Student Writer, Nova Law Review
(May 26, 1993) (on file with this writer).
2. Id.
3. Id.; see infra Appendix A.
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more severe than those sustained in private passenger automobiles.' A
motorcyclist is not surrounded by the protective structure of an automobile
when a collision occurs.' The motorcycle's first impact with the other
vehicle will send the rider hurling through the air to make a second and
devastating impact with the ground or surrounding structure.' Therefore,
motorcyclists not only die more often,7 but are also injured more often and
more severely than motorists in automobiles.8  This combination has
prompted much litigation to define these vehicles and the insurance coverage
available to their victims.
The Florida District Courts of Appeal, once again, disagree on such a
coverage question. There is now a conflict between the Third and Fourth
District Courts of Appeal9 regarding whether or not a motorcycle is a motor
vehicle under the owned-uninsured vehicle exclusion in uninsured motorist
coverage ("UM").' ° This conflict, which has emerged with the recent deci-
sions of Petersen v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co." and Grant v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 2 will soon force the Florida Supreme Court
to re-examine its "polestar"' 3 opinion regarding uninsured motorist cover-
age,'4 and change the way Florida courts define an insured.' 5
The purpose of this comment is to provide a guide for the attorney
faced with the confusing task of defining a motor vehicle under Florida
4. See Joseph Kelner & Robert S. Kelner, Motorcycle Cases, N.Y.L.J., May 8, 1990, at
3.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See infra Appendix B.
8. For every motorcyclist killed, there are approximately 90 others injured severely
enough to require medical care. Frederick P. Rivara, M.D., The Public Cost of Motorcycle
Trauma, 260 JAMA 221 (1988) [hereinafter Motorcycle Trauma].
9. The Fifth District has also rendered a decision regarding this issue. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hatcher, 592 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam)
(affirming summary judgment rendered in favor of the insured).
10. Uninsured motorist coverage is "[pirotection afforded an insured by first party
insurance against bodily injury inflicted by an uninsured motorist, after the liability of the
uninsured motorist for the injury has been established." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1532
(6th ed. 1990).
11. 615 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 623 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1993).
12. 620 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
13. See Valiant Ins. Co. v. Webster, 567 So. 2d 408, 411 (Fla. 1990) (coining the
adjective).
14. Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1971).
15. On May 13, 1993, State Farm filed a petition for discretionary review based on the
conflict that now exists. Petitioner's Brief, State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Peterson, 615
So. 2d 181 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) (No. 81,740), reviewgranted, 623 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1993).
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insurance law. The comment will discuss UM and the history of the owned-
uninsured vehicle exclusion in Florida. The comment will then review the
key cases defining motorcycles and "motor vehicles" 6 in other areas of
insurance and will demonstrate that under Florida's insurance law, "motor
vehicle" has no plain meaning. The comment will conclude with an
analysis of the courts' reasoning in Grant and Petersen and will propose a
direction tbr the courts and the Florida Legislature.
II. THE COVERAGE CONFLICT
A. Petersen v. State Farm
On February 22, 1991, Robert Petersen was severely injured when his
uninsured 1986 Yamaha motorcycle collided with an uninsured motorist. 7
When the accident occurred, Petersen also owned a 1988 Ford truck which
was insured by State Farm Fire & Casualty Company ("State Farm").' 8
The policy provided coverage for "damages for bodily injury an insured is
legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor
vehicle."' 9 It also contained the following exclusion:
THERE IS NO COVERAGE:
FOR BODILY INJURY TO AN INSURED WHILE OCCUPYING A
MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU, YOUR SPOUSE OR ANY
RELATIVE IF IT IS NOT INSURED FOR THIS COVERAGE
UNDER THIS POLICY.2 °
The only definition for the term "motor vehicle" was provided in the
No-Fault section of the policy, which, in accordance with Florida's No-Fault
Law,2 ' defined a "motor vehicle" as:
[A] vehicle with four or more wheels that:
16. The survey includes mopeds, minibikes, three-wheeled vehicles, golf carts, and lawn
mowers.
17. Appellant's Initial Brief at 2, Petersen v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 615 So.
2d 181 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (No. 92-01828).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 3. This is commonly called the "owned-uninsured motor vehicle exclusion."
See IRVIN E. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE § 32.02 (revised ed. 1993).
21. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-627.7405 (1991).
1993]
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1. is self propelled and is of a type;
a. designed for, and
b. required to be licensed for use on Florida highways; or
2. is a trailer or semitrailer designed for use with a
vehicle described in 1 above.22
Petersen asserted that because the State Farm policy defined a motor
vehicle as one with four or more wheels, his motorcycle was not a motor
vehicle under the terms of the policy. 23 The motorcycle, therefore, could
not be excluded from coverage under the owned-uninsured vehicle exclusion
and the uninsured motorist coverage provided by the policy covered him for
his injuries .2  In the alternative, Petersen argued that the term "motor
vehicle" was ambiguous, 25 and the ambiguity must be construed in favor
of the insured.26
Conversely, State Farm asserted that the definition of the term "motor
vehicle" under the No-Fault provision was not applicable to the uninsured
motorist provision.2 7 Absent any applicable definition for UM, the term
"motor vehicle" must be given its plain meaning which, State Farm asserted,
includes motorcycles.28
On March 2, 1993, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the
summary judgment which had been rendered in favor of State Farm.29 The
court held that the term "motor vehicle," as used in the policy, was
ambiguous and the policy was, therefore, construed against the insurer.3 °
22. Appellant's Initial Brief at 4, Petersen (No. 92-01828).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 5.
25. Id. at 6. In demonstrating the ambiguity, appellant cited to several Florida Statutes
sections which define "motor vehicle." See FLA. STAT. § 627.041(8) (1991) (insurance rates
and rating); FLA. STAT. § 316.209(1) (1991)(traffic control); FLA. STAT. § 627.732(1) (1991)
(No-Fault law).
26. Appellant's Initial Brief at 6, Petersen(No. 92-01828) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 498 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 1986)).
27. Appellee's Brief at 10, Petersen v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 615 So. 2d 181
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (No. 92-01828).
28. Id.
29. Petersen, 615 So. 2d at 182.
30. Id. (citing National Auto. Ass'n v. Brumit, 98 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1957); Ceron v.
Paxton Nat'l Ins. Co., 537 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 545 So. 2d
1368 (Fla. 1989)).
[Vol. 18
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B. Grant v. State Farm
On April 7, 1993, the Fourth District Court of Appeal decided a case
that was factually identical to Petersen,3' but reached the opposite result.32
In Grant v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., the Fourth District held that
a motorcycle was a motor vehicle "based upon statutory definition, public
policy, and precedent (by analogy)" and affirmed the summary judgment
rendered in favor of State Farm."
For statutory definition, the Grant court looked to the Financial
Responsibility Law, which specifies the minimum amount of insurance
required by Florida drivers. 34 By defining a motor vehicle as "[e]very self
propelled vehicle which is designed and required to be licensed for use upon
a highway . . . "" the Financial Responsibility Law's general definition
includes motorcycles.36 For public policy, the Grant court cited Standard
Marine Insurance Co. v. Allyn," which held that the Financial Responsibil-
ity Law's definition of motor vehicle was more appropriate for defining an
uninsured motor vehicle, as using the No-Fault definition would impermis-
sibly limit coverage where an insured was struck by an uninsured motorcy-
cle.3" Such limitation on coverage was considered against the public policy
of the UM statute.39
Finally, the precedent cited by the court consists of cases that were
decided when Florida's antistacking" statute included UM coverage.4
31. Both cases involved "U3" non-stacked uninsured motorist coverage issued by State
Farm. Hatcher also involved State Farm's "UY' coverage. Appellant's Initial Brief at 2,
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hatcher, 592 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(No. 91-500715); see supra note 9.
32. See Grant v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 620 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1993).
33. Id. at 780.
34. Id. at 779 (citing FLA. STAT. § 324.021(1) (1991)).
35. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 324.021(1) (1991)).
36. See Appellee's Answer Brief at 8-9, Grant v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 620
So. 2d 778 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (No. 91-03303).
37. Grant, 620 So. 2d at 779 (discussing Standard Marine Ins. Co. v. Allyn, 333 So. 2d
497 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1976)).
38. Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 499.
39. Id.
40. "Stacking" is the concept of adding or multiplying uninsured or underinsured
motorist coverage available to an injured accident victim from multiple sources. John G.
Douglass & Francis E. Telegadas, Stacking of Uninsured and Underinsured Motor Vehicle
Coverages, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 87 (1989). For example, if an insured owns three
automobiles, each with UM limits of $10,000 per accident, he could add all three together
and recover $30,000, provided his injuries exceeded that amount and he was injured by an
19931
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Uninsured motorist coverage was eliminated from the antistacking statute in
1980.42 With the 1987 amendments43 to the UM statute allowing selec-
tive destacking," the Grant court implied that this precedent may again be
5, 45applicable "by analogy".
Although the Petersen and Grant courts effectively reach opposite
results, with Petersen finding coverage for the insured and Grant finding no
coverage under identical language of the same policy, the rationale applied
by these courts are different. Petersen relies on rules of policy construc-
tion,46 while Grant relies on the supposed public policy of the UM
statute.47 As Petersen deals with a narrow issue of policy construction, this
article will, instead, focus on Grant and demonstrate that the public policy
considered by the court is either no longer valid, or is inapplicable to these
cases. To fully understand the reasoning of the court, one must review the
history of the owned-uninsured vehicle exclusion and the different ways in
which it has been handled in Florida courts.
III. UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
World War 1I and the proliferation of the mass produced automobile
on America's highways prompted a need to provide compensation when this
dangerous instrumentality 48 was used negligently. 49  Although some
motorists transferred the economic risk of their negligence through the
purchase of liability insurance, many drivers neither purchased insurance nor
uninsured motorist. Florida's antistacking statute was enacted in 1976 to prohibit this
practice with UM and other insurance coverages. See FLA. STAT. § 627.4132 (1977).
41. Grant, 620 So. 2d at 779-80 (citing Indomenico v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
388 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980); State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kuhn, 374 So. 2d
1079 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 383 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.
1980)); see also FLA. STAT. § 627.4132 (1977).
42. Ch. 80-364, § 1, 1980 Fla. Laws 1495 (amending FLA. STAT. § 627.4132 (1979)).
43. Ch. 87-213, § 1, 1987 Fla. Laws 1341, 1343 (amending FLA. STAT. § 627.727
(1986)).
44. FLA. STAT. § 627.727(9) (1991).
45. Grant, 620 So. 2d at 780.
46. Petersen, 615 So. 2d at 182.
47. Grant, 620 So. 2d at 779-80.
48. A dangerous instrumentality is "[alnything which has the inherent capacity to place
people in peril, either in itself ... or by a careless use of it ...... BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 394 (6th ed. 1990).
49. See generally ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
INSURANCE § 1.1, at 3-4 (2d ed. 1985) (historical development of UM coverage).
[Vol. 18
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had the financial resources to compensate the victims of their careless-
ness.50  Because a significant number of injured motorists were left
uncompensated for injuries by financially irresponsible drivers, pressure
upon legislatures to require liability insurance for all drivers increased.5
This pressure led to two significant developments in motor vehicle tort law:
financial responsibility statutes and UM coverage.52
Uninsured motorist coverage is now required in forty nine states,
53
and was first required in Florida in 1961. 5' Since its enactment, the UM
statute has been the subject of much litigation, interpretation, and amend-
ment.55 The landmark case interpreting UM coverage in Florida is Mullis
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,56 and no discussion of
UM may begin without a review of this Florida Supreme Court opinion.
A. Mullis v. State Farm
Interestingly, the facts of Mullis are similar to those of Grant and
Petersen. On May 25, 1967, Richard Lamar Mullis was severely injured
when he was struck by an uninsured automobile while riding his mother's
uninsured Honda motorcycle.57 His parents owned two other vehicles
which were insured by State Farm. 8 The policies defined an insured as
including "the first person named in the declarations and while residents of
his household, his spouse and the relatives of either . . . ."" The UM
sections included "owned-uninsured" exclusions similar to those in Grant
and Petersen.6° State Farm refused to arbitrate the claim, asserting that
although Richard Mullis was an insured, the motorcycle was excluded.6'
50. Id. Widiss refers to these drivers as the "financially irresponsible". Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. WiDISS, supra note 49, § 1.12, at 14. Only Michigan does not require insurers to
offer UM. Id. at 4.
54. Ch. 61-175, § 1, 1961 Fla. Laws 291, 292 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.0851
(1961)) (renumbered as FLA. STAT. § 627.727 in 1970).
55. The statute has been amended so many times that one judge equated the relationship
between the Florida Legislature and the UM statute to that between a fragile beach and a
hurricane, "except the annual storm season in the legislature arrives a few months earlier."
Quirk v. Anthony, 563 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
56. 252 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1971).
57. Id. at 231.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Mullis, 252 So. 2d at 231.
1993l
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The trial court granted summary judgment for State Farm, which was
affirmed by the district court of appeal. 62 The Florida Supreme Court re-
versed 63 and set up the foundation for analyzing UM coverage that is still
followed.64
In labeling UM the counterpart of the Financial Responsibility Law,65
the court stated that UM coverage "provides bodily injury family protection
as if, and to the extent, the uninsured motorist had been covered by a
standard automobile liability insurance policy under the Financial Responsi-
bility Law. 66 Because the Financial Responsibility Law is mandated by
statute, it cannot be narrowed by exclusions contrary to the law.67
Similarly, a carrier could not narrow UM coverage in a manner contrary to
the purpose of the UM statute which, as the court stated, was to "provide
uniform and specific insurance benefits to members of the public to cover
damages for bodily injury caused by the negligence of insolvent or
uninsured motorists and such statutorily fixed and prescribed protection is
not reducible by insurers' policy exclusions and exceptions .... ,61
The court then classified insureds into two groups: Class I insureds,
which included the named insured, the named insured's spouse, and relatives
residing in the same household; 69 and, Class II insureds, permissive users
or passengers of the insured vehicle.7° Coverage for Class II insureds was
linked to the vehicle they occupied when injured. Therefore, Class II
insureds were only covered for injury that occurred in or by the insured
vehicle.7' Class I insureds, however, were covered
[w]henever bodily injury is inflicted upon [them] ... by the negligence
of an uninsured motorist, under whatever conditions, locations, or
circumstances, any of such insureds happen to be in at the time ....
They may be pedestrians at the time of such injury, they may be riding
62. Id. at 232.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Florida Farm Bureau v. Hurtado, 587 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 1991); see also
Coleman v. Florida Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 517 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1988) (applying the Mullis
doctrine).
65. Mullis, 252 So. 2d at 233.
66. Id. at 236.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 233-34.
69. Both Peterson and Grant were named insureds on their respective policies and were,
therefore, Class I insureds. See Grant, 620 So. 2d at 778; Petersen, 615 So. 2d at 181.
70. Mullis, 252 So. 2d at 233.
71. Id.
[Vol. 18
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in motor vehicles of others or in public conveyances and they may
occupy motor vehicles (including Honda motorcycles) owned by but
which are not "insured automobiles" of named insured.7
Thus, the Mullis court invalidated the owned-uninsured vehicle
exclusion, and any other exclusion that attempted to "whittle away ' 7 at the
coverage mandated by the UM statute. 74 Accordingly, defining the vehicle
which a Class I insured occupied when injured was unnecessary under the
Mullis doctrine. Although similar fact patterns have arisen in the courts
since Mullis was decided, defining a motorcycle was unnecessary as long as
the exclusion was invalid, and the type of vehicle occupied by a Class I
insured did not affect coverage. The antistacking nature of this exclu-
sion, 75 however, has left it alternatively, valid and invalid, depending on
the status of stacking in Florida.
B. The Owned-Uninsured Vehicle Exclusion and Stacking
Statutory Schizophrenia
Stacking permits an automobile owner to provide UM coverage for
himself and members of his family while operating or occupying any owned
vehicle, even if only one of them has UM coverage.76 The owned-
uninsured exclusion was developed to circumvent the effects of stacking by
precluding coverage if the insured is injured in or by a vehicle which he
owned, but was not insured under the particular policy.7 7 Because of its
antistacking effect, the owned-uninsured vehicle exclusion has been
considered valid or invalid by Florida's courts depending on whether or not
stacking was prohibited by statute.7"
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing First Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Devine, 211 So. 2d 587, 589 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1968) (invalidating endorsement which precluded coverage for drivers under twenty-
five years of age)).
74. The only exception recognized by the Mullis court was that under the statute, an
insured could elect to reject the coverage altogether. Id. at 238; see also FLA. STAT. §
627.727(1) (1991).
75. See SCHERMER, supra note 20, § 31.02.
76. Id. § 32.02; see also supra note 40.
77. SCHERMER, supra note 20, § 32.02.
78. See, e.g., Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Pohlman, 485 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1986). The
supreme court's opinion in Pohlman clarified the relationship between the owned-uninsured
vehicle exclusion and the antistacking statute. In Pohlman, the insured purchased a policy
covering two vehicles on March 1, 1979, when the antistacking statute was in effect. Id. at
419. On February 27, 1981, after UM was removed from the antistacking statute, the insured
Tamir
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Stacking of UM coverage was permitted in Florida until 1976, when
Florida's Legislature enacted the antistacking statute. 79  Because the
Legislature targeted UM in response to case law which allowed stacking,8"
it effectively repealed the statute in 1980 when it removed UM from the
antistacking statute.81 In 1987, the Legislature compromised by giving
insureds the opportunity to select non-stacked policies if they so chose.82
Under the 1987 amendment, insurers may now offer policies with exclusions
preventing stacking of coverage, including the owned-uninsured vehicle
exclusion. 3
added an additional vehicle. Id. After the insured was injured while riding a motorcycle
which he owned but did not insure with Firemen's Fund, the court held that the insured could
recover under the coverage added in 1981, despite an owned-uninsured vehicle exclusion.
Id. at 421. The insured could not, however, stack the coverage for the two vehicles insured
in 1979. Id.; see also Hausler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 374 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (where policy was purchased one month before the antistacking statute
was signed into law, insured was entitled to coverage under prior case law despite owned-
uninsured vehicle exclusion).
79. Florida Statutes section 627.4132 in its entirety provided:
If an insured or named insured is protected by any type of motor vehicle
insurance policy for liability, uninsured motorist, personal injury protection, or
any other coverage, the policy shall provide that the insured or named insured
is protected only to the extent of the coverage he has on the vehicle involved in
the accident. However, if none of the insured's or named insured's vehicles is
involved in the accident, coverage is available only to the extent of coverage on
any one of the vehicles with applicable coverage. Coverage on any other
vehicles shall not be added to or stacked upon that coverage. This section shall
not apply to reduce the coverage available by reason of insurance policies
insuring different named insureds.
FLA. STAT. § 627.4132 (1977) (emphasis added); see also supra note 40 and accompanying
text.
80. Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Com., SB 829 (1987) Staff Analysis 1 (April 27, 1987)
(on file with this writer).
81. Id. The statute, in pertinent part, currently reads:
This section does not apply:
1. To uninsured motorist coverage which is separately governed by §
627.727.
2. To reduce the coverage available by reasons of insur-
ance policies insuring different named insureds.
FLA. STAT. § 627.4132(1) (1991).
82. See FLA. STAT. § 627.727(9) (1991). In exchange for the lower exposure, insurers
must roll back premiums to the insured by 20% on all destacked policies. Id.
83. Id. Florida Statutes section 627.727(9) states:
Insurers may offer policies of uninsured motorist coverage containing
policy provisions, in language approved by the department, establishing that if
the insured accepts this offer: ....
[Vol. 18
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The case law relating to the owned-uninsured vehicle exclusion
likewise alternates between finding the exclusion valid or invalid depending
upon the version of the statute applicable when the case accrued.84
Accordingly, the case law relating to this exclusion and stacking can be
categorized chronologically: cases accruing before 1976, which find the
exclusion invalid and hold that the Class I insured can recover; 5 cases
accruing between 1976 and 1980, which find the exclusion valid under the
antistacking statute and hold that the Class I insured cannot recover;86 cases
accruing between 1980 and 1987, which reinstate Mullis as precedent and,
again, find the exclusion invalid; and cases accruing after 1987, whose
findings and holdings have mixed results.8
The reason for mixed results in cases under the current statute is that
there are now two types of policies in the insurance market, stacked and
nonstacked.8 9 The Grant court asserted that prior case law from the
(d) The uninsured motorist coverage provided by the policy does not
apply to the named insured or family members residing in his household who
are injured while occupying any vehicle owned by such insureds for which
uninsured motorist coverage was not purchased.
Id.
84. See Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Pohlman 485 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1986); New
Hampshire Ins. Group v. Harbach, 439 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1983); Mullis v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1971); Peterson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 615
So. 2d 181 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 609 So.
2d 1385 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Beem, 469 So.
2d 138 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Reynolds v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 437 So.
2d 195 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983), reviewdenied, 447 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1984); Progressive
Am. Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 428 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Indomenico v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 388 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wimpee, 376 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 385 So.
2d 762 (Fla. 1980); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kuhn, 374 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 383 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980); Hausler v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 374 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); McDonald v.
Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co., 373 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Johnson v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., 289 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
85. See, e.g., Mullis, 252 So. 2d at 238; Hausler, 374 So. 2d at 1038; McDonald, 373
So. 2d at 95; Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 289 So. 2d at 750.
86. See Harbach, 439 So. 2d at 1386; Reynolds, 437 So. 2d at 196 (case accruing in
1979); Indomenico, 388 So. 2d at 30-31; Wimpee, 376 So. 2d at 21; Kuhn, 374 So. 2d at
1081.
87. See Beem, 469 So. 2d at 140; accord Glenn, 428 So. 2d at 368.
88. Compare Phillips, 609 So. 2d at 1390-91 with Peterson, 615 So. 2d at 182.
89. A Florida practitioner must therefore be careful in determining which type of policy
his client carries. For example, State Farm currently offers stacked UM coverage called "U"
Tamir
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antistacking era is now applicable to nonstacked policies "by analogy,"9
in the same way the Florida Supreme Court reinstated prior case law in
Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Co. v. Hurtado.91 In Hurtado, the court
held that the amendment eliminating UM from the antistacking statute
operated to revive prior case law that permitted stacking for Class I
insureds.92 Hurtado is distinguishable, however, in that the court cited
legislative history which indicated the Legislature's intent to "revive prior
case law which permitted and determined the extent of the stacking of
uninsured motorist insurance policies."93 There is no similar language in
the legislative history of the 1987 amendment.94 It is unclear, therefore,
if the Legislature intended precedent from the antistacking era to again
control determination of UM coverage. If the supreme court adopts the
Grant court's analogy, there will be two separate bodies of case law that are
mutually exclusive but equally applicable. Stacked policies, following
Mullis, will provide UM benefits wherever the injury occurred and, because
the exclusion is invalid, defining the occupied vehicle remains irrelevant.95
Nonstacked policies, however, containing a valid exclusion in compliance
with Florida's UM statute96 will be construed under Harbach,9 7 and the
nonstacked definition of the occupied vehicle becomes an issue.
IV. MOTOR VEHICLES DEFINED
Because of these changes in the UM statute, the definition of a motor
vehicle has only recently become important again in determining UM
coverage. Although the term "uninsured motor vehicle" is defined in the
UM statute, this definition explains when a vehicle is uninsured and does
in addition to the nonstacked "UY' in dispute in Grant and Peterson.
90. Grant, 620 So. 2d at 780; see also CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COMM.,
FLORIDA BAR, FLORIDA AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE LAW § 4.38 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter
FLORIDA LAW].
91. 587 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 1991).
92. Id. at 1318.
93. Id. (citing Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ins., HB 1315 (1980) Staff Analysis (June
16, 1980)).
94. See Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Com., SB 829 (1987) Staff Analysis (April 27, 1987)
(on file with this writer); Staff of H.R. Comm. on Ins., HB 1029 Staff Analysis (1987) (April
20, 1987) (on file with this writer).
95. See Phillips, 609 So. 2d at 1388-89.
96. See FLA. STAT. § 627.727(9)(d) (1991).
97. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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not define the vehicle itself.9" Any definition of a "motor vehicle" must,
therefore, be gleaned from cases and other statutes. 99 The two major
statutory sources for defining a motor vehicle have been the Financial
Responsibility Law, and Florida's No-Fault Law.'00 Because application
of either statutory definition will yield opposite results, they will be
discussed separately.
A. No-Fault Insurance
The term "motor vehicle" is defined in several places in Florida's stat-
utes.'' Because Florida's No-Fault law0 2 also deals with automobile
insurance, its definition has often been asserted as the controlling definition
of a motor vehicle.0 3 The No-Fault statute is also the source from which
State Farm derived its definition of "motor vehicle" for the No-Fault
provisions of its automobile policy.0 4
Creating Personal Injury Protection Benefits ("PIP"), Florida's No-Fault
statute was enacted to provide baseline coverage for an injured person's
medical expenses, lost income, death benefits, and funeral expenses without
regard to fault.0 5 Much like workers' compensation, in exchange for
recovery of basic expenses without the burden of proving fault, the injured
98. See FLA. STAT. § 627.727(3) (1991).
99. CJ. Prinzo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 465 So. 2d 1364, 1365 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App.) (holding that definitions provided under the: No-Fault Act, FLA. STAT. §
627.732(1) (1983); Traffic Control Law, FLA. STAT. § 316.003(2)(21) (1983); Motor Vehicle
Licensing Law, FLA. STAT. § 320.01(1) (1983); and Financial Responsibility Law, FLA.
STAT. § 324.021(1) (1983), should be read in pari materia in defining a moped) (citing State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Link, 416 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)), review
denied, 475 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1985).
100. See Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 499.
101. See supra notes 25, 98, 99.
102. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-627.7405 (1991).
103. See, e.g., Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 498 (carrier asserted that the No-Fault definition
contained in the PIP provision of an automobile policy applied to defining the uninsured
motor vehicle, which was a motorcycle).
104. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
105. The purpose of the statute is to:
provide for medical, surgical, funeral, and disability insurance benefits without
regard to fault, and to require motor vehicle insurance securing such benefits, for
motor vehicles required to be registered in this state and, with respect to motor
vehicle accidents, a limitation on the right to claim damages for pain, suffering,
mental anguish, and inconvenience.
FLA. STAT. § 627.731 (1991).
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loses his right to pursue a bodily injury claim in tort unless his injuries meet
a minimum threshold of severity."°6
The statute defines a "motor vehicle" as "any self-propelled vehicle
with four or more wheels which is of a type both designed and required to
be licensed for use on the highways of this state and any trailer or
semitrailer designed for use with such vehicle . *.". ." ' By definition, the
phrase "four or more wheels" under no-fault clearly excludes any two
wheeled vehicles, including motorcycles. The Legislature deliberately
excluded coverage to motorcycles because of the higher risk of severe
injuries faced by the driver or passenger of a motorcycle.' There is an
underlying belief that anyone who rides a motorcycle has assumed this
higher risk of injury."0 9 Although insurance for medical expenses result-
ing from injury are available to motorcyclists, such coverage is expensive
and not mandated by statute. 110
There are two ways in which a vehicle must be defined under PIP.
The vehicle that struck the claimant must be a motor vehicle, and the
vehicle that the claimant occupied when struck must be either a motor
vehicle or not a self propelled vehicle."' If the claimant is occupying a
motor vehicle, he need not be struck by anything at all as the claimant's
106. Id; see also FLA. STAT. § 627.737(2) (1991).
107. FLA. STAT. § 627.732(1) (1991) (emphasis added); see also supra note 22.
108. See Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 560 So. 2d 393, 394 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
("[Tintent seems to focus on the equipment's propensity for accidental injury during
operation, excluding those types of vehicles with the highest propensity for injury from
coverage such as motorcycles ...."); cf State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nicholson, 337
So. 2d 860, 862 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (finding three-wheeled police vehicle is a
motor vehicle because its physical characteristics, including safety equipment, were more
determinative than the number of wheels); see also supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
109. Unfortunately, this assumption is often shared by juries, making it more difficult
to prove fault in motorcycle accident cases. See Kelner & Kelner, supra note 4, at 3.
110. Accordingly, a motorcyclist does not have to meet the statutory injury threshold
requirement in order to pursue a claim for non-economic damages against the tortfeasor. See
Scherzer v. Beron, 455 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.) (holding that a motorcyclist is
not required to meet the statutory injury threshold to maintain tort action), cause dismissed,
459 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1984); cf Santiagoherrera v. Stout, 470 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (because a bus was not a motor vehicle under the No-Fault statute, woman
injured while driving the bus did not have to meet the threshold).
1ll. In describing the coverage required, section 627.736(1) of the Florida Statutes states
that every insurance policy complying with the statute must provide PIP to "the named
insured, relatives residing in the same household, persons operating the insured motor vehicle,
passengers in such motor vehicle, and other persons struck by such motor vehicle and
suffering bodily injury while not an occupant of a selfpropelled vehicle .... FLA. STAT.
§ 627.736(l) (1991) (emphasis added).
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injury need only alight from operation, maintenance, or use of the vehi-
cle.112 At the other extreme, however, if the claimant is a pedestrian or
bicyclist, then he must be injured by a collision with a motor vehicle which,
by definition, precludes motorcycles, mopeds, minibikes and any other two
wheeled vehicle." 3  Most of the litigation comes from the gray area
between the automobile and the pedestrian, and classifying the modes of
transportation that fall in between as either motor vehicles or self propelled
vehicles.
In defining the vehicle occupied by the blaimant, the importance of the
"self propelled vehicle" distinction becomes apparent. A motorcycle, with
its high rate of speed and propensity for injury, is excluded because it is a
self propelled vehicle.114 Conversely, mini-bikes and mopeds, with a
much lower brake horsepower, are viewed as less dangerous by Florida
courts, 1 5 and are, therefore, considered bicycles and not self propelled
vehicles." ; Accordingly, under PIP, an automobile, a three wheeled
police vehicle," 7 and a golf cart"' are motor vehicles, but a motorcycle
is not.1 9 A motorcycle and lawn mower' are self propelled vehicles,
112. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (1991); see also Hemandez v. Protective Casualty Ins.
Co., 473 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1985) (holding PIP was recoverable for claimant who was injured
when pulled out of his car by police during an arrest for a traffic violation); Government
Employees Iris. Co. v. Novak, 453 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1984) (holding PIP was recoverable by
plaintiff's estate where plaintiff was shot in her vehicle after refusing to give the assailant a
ride).
113. See Prinzo, 465 So. 2d at 1365 (pedestrian struck by a moped could not recover
PIP or UM).
114. Cf Meister v. Fisher, 462 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1984) (finding a golf cart is a motor
vehicle and a dangerous instrumentality).
115. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Link, 416 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1982); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. O'Kelly, 349 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1977), cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1978); see also Nicholson, 337 So. 2d at 860
(three wheeled police vehicle which had enclosed cabin, was steered with wheel, and could
stand upright when not ridden, was more like a motor vehicle than a self propelled vehicle
despite the "four or more" wheels requirement of the statute).
116. See Velez v. Criterion Ins. Co., 461 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 1984); Prinzo, 465 So. 2d
at 1365; Link, 416 So. 2d at 876.
117. Nicholson, 337 So. 2d at 862; see supra note 115.
118. Meister, 462 So. 2d at 1072.
119. Dunlap v. United States Auto. Ass'n, 470 So. 2d 98, 99 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Scherzer,455 So. 2d at 441; Brandal v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 327 So. 2d 867
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1976); Long Island Ins. Co. v.
Frank, 328 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
120. See Miller, 560 So. 2d at 393 (insured who was struck by a motor vehicle while
riding a lawn mower could not recover PIP benefits). In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stone
asserts that a lawn mower is no more a self propelled vehicle than is an electric wheelchair.
1993]
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but a moped is not. 2' Finally, a moped is a bicycle and not a motorcycle
or "self propelled vehicle."' 2
To illustrate, when a car hits a pedestrian, both the pedestrian and
driver recover."2 3 Likewise when a car strikes a moped. If, however, a
motorcycle or moped strikes a pedestrian, neither the pedestrian nor rider
can recover.'24 Finally, when a car strikes a motorcycle, the car driver
can recover, but the motorcyclist cannot.'25 As these examples show,
determining coverage under PIP involves a simultaneous evaluation of both
the vehicle occupied by the claimant and the vehicle that struck the claim-
ant. If a motorcycle was involved in the accident on either side, the
claimant will not recover unless the claimant was in a car.
Cases defining motorcycles in other areas of insurance further illustrate
the bias against motorcycles in Florida. Cases defining the unowned
vehicles under liability coverage,'26 for example, have produced some
results similar to the PIP cases. Although defining the insured vehicle is
easily accomplished by looking at the declarations page of the policy, this
will not define unowned vehicles driven by the named insured.'27 Florida
Id. at 395 (Stone, J., dissenting). His dissent demonstrates how far the courts may go to
preclude recovery.
121. Velez, 461 So. 2d at 1349; Prinzo, 465 So. 2d at 1365; Link, 416 So. 2d at 878.
122. See, e.g., Velez, 461 So. 2d at 1349; see also FLA. STAT. § 316.003(2) (1991).
123. The pedestrian recovers because he is not on a "self propelled vehicle" when struck
by a "motor vehicle"; the driver recovers because his injury alights from the "operation,
maintenance and use" of the motor vehicle.
124. The pedestrian can not recover because, although he is not the occupant of a self
propelled vehicle, he was not struck by a motor vehicle. The moped rider cannot recover,
because, as with the pedestrian, although he was not the occupant of a self propelled vehicle,
he was not struck by a motor vehicle. The motorcyclist cannot recover both because he was
the not the occupant of a motor vehicle, and because he was the occupant of a self propelled
vehicle.
125. The car driver recovers because his injuries alighted from operation, maintenance
and use of a motor vehicle. Although the motorcyclist was struck by a motor vehicle, the
motorcyclist cannot recover because he or she was not the driver of a motor vehicle and was
the occupant of a self propelled vehicle.
126. Automobile liability insurance, usually "provides that the insurer will pay damages
that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of personal injury or property
damage to others caused by an accident resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use
of the ... insured motor vehicle." FLORIDA LAW, supra note 90, § 5.2. Automobile liability
insurance will also typically protect the insured as well as family residents of the insured's
household, when he or she is driving unowned vehicles. Id. § 5.8.
127. See Florida Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pitzer, 330 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App.) (where policy defined "motor vehicle" as the motor vehicle, semitrailer, or trailer
described in the policy, court held that this definition does not define automobile not
[Vol. 18
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courts have held that, absent a definition of the term "automobile" in the
policy, a motorcycle is not an automobile, and coverage for injuries caused
to others while driving an uninsured motorcycle is precluded." 8
Homeowner's insurance also contains liability coverage that indemnifies
the insured for injury caused to others on the premises, as well as medical
payments coverage which provides reimbursement of medical expenses for
injuries caused by the insured when off the insured premises. 29  To
prevent duplication of automobile insurance, homeowner's policies typically
exclude coverage for property damage and bodily injury arising from the use
of any "land motor vehicle."'30  In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Caronia,T'
the insured's minor son injured the plaintiff while driving someone else's
motorcycle. The court held that a motorcycle was a "land vehicle" under
the policy exclusion and, as a result, the injured plaintiff could not
recover.' Likewise, a three-wheeled power driven cycle, called a "Tri-
sport," was considered a land motor vehicle under the same exclusionary
language.'33 As under No-Fault, however, a moped was considered a
bicycle and not a "land motor vehicle."'34
In Loftus v. Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co.,'3 the insured was
killed while riding a motorcycle. In construing a policy providing coverage
for accidental injury sustained while driving or riding within an automobile,
the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the insured's motorcycle was
not an automobile and, thus, his spouse could not recover for his death.'36
described in the policy), cert. dismissed, 336 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1976).
128. Heritage Ins. Co. of Am. v. Canter, 342 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
Pitzer, 330 So. 2d at 499.
129. 3 WARREN FREEDMAN, FREEDMAN'S RICHARDS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE,
Appendix K at 442 (6th ed. 1990); see also TORT AND INSURANCE SECTION, PROPERTY
INSURANCE LAW COMM., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANNOTATIONS TO THE HOMEOWN-
ERS POLICY 18 (2d ed. 1990) (reproduction of Insurance Services Office (ISO) and State
Farm Homeowner's policies with annotations).
130. FREEDMAN, supra note 129, at Appendix K.
131. 395 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
132. Id. at 1223.
133. Johnson v. Unigard Ins. Co., 387 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
134. See Ortiz v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 475 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Lane v. Allstate Ins. Co., 472 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reviewdenied, 482
So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1985).
135. 314 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 327 So. 2d 33 (Fla.
1976).
136. Id. at 161; cf Stewart v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 316 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 197.5) (police motorcycle excluded as emergency vehicle under accidental death and
dismemberment provision).
1993] 699
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Generalizations emerge when viewing these cases together. First, if a
motorcycle has anything to do with causing the injury, the claimant will
usually not recover.'37 Second, courts define vehicles based upon their
propensity to cause injury, rather than strictly by statutory or policy
construction. 3 ' Finally, the vehicle the claimant was occupying when
injured is critical in determining coverage. 39
The exception, however, has been the UM statute, under which, as a
matter of public policy, the insured could purchase coverage for himself and
his family regardless of the type of vehicle driven, or its propensity for
injury."4  Because the occupied vehicle distinction typical of No-Fault
was contrary to this public policy, the PIP definition was not applied to UM
coverage. 4'
Although the public policy in determining UM has historically been to
provide coverage for the insured wherever or whenever an accident
occurs, 4 2 the 1987 statutory amendment allowing nonstacked policies'43
has changed this principle.144 In nonstacked policies provided by the amend-
ment, the vehicle occupied by the insured becomes the critical determinant
of coverage much as it does under the No-Fault law.'45 The No-Fault
definition of a motor vehicle may, therefore, be more applicable to UM, at
least to nonstacked policies, than it has in the past. Thus, while the Grant
court asserts that the policy definition, which is patterned after the No-Fault
statute, is inapposite, the underlying rationale for the inapplicability may not
be valid in construing nonstacked policies.'46
137. See, e.g., Dunlap, 470 So. 2d at 99-100 (precluding recovery for plaintiff because
he was originally riding a motorcycle, even though he was thrown off and into the roadway
by a truck collision and was later injured when run over by a taxi).
138. See Nicholson, 337 So. 2d at 862; Miller, 560 So. 2d at 393; see also supra note
108.
139. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 66, 72.
141. See, e.g., Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 499.
142. E.g., Mullis, 252 So. 2d at 233; Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 499.
143. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
145. Section 627.727(9)(b) of the Florida Statutes states, "[i]f at the time of the accident
the injured person is occupying a motor vehicle, the uninsured motorist coverage available
to him is the coverage available as to that motor vehicle." FLA. STAT. § 627.727(9)(b)
(1991) (emphasis added).
146. Both Petersen and Grant had purchased nonstacked policies.
[Vol. 18
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B. Grant and the Financial Responsibility Equation
The Grant court held that public policy requires application of the
Financial Responsibility Law definition of motor vehicle.'47 This public
policy is rooted in the reciprocal relationship between the Financial
Responsibility Law and the UM statute, and their intertwined histories.'48
Financial responsibility laws attempt to induce drivers to procure
liability insurance to cover injury their negligence causes to others.'49
Florida's Financial Responsibility Law' 50 was enacted in 1955 to promote
"safety, and provide financial security by such owners and operators whose
responsibility it is to recompense others for injury to person or property
caused by the operation of a motor vehicle . . . ,, "' Both UM insurance
and the Financial Responsibility Law, therefore, were created as solutions
to the same problem: The financially irresponsible driver, with Financial
Responsibility Laws inducing third party coverage, and UM insurance
offering first party coverage for the same risk. 52  This relationship was
recognized by the Florida Supreme Court in Mullis, when the court called
UM the "reciprocal or mutual equivalent of automobile liability coverage
prescribed by the Financial Responsibility Law."'
147. Grant, 620 So. 2d at 779.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
149. WIDISS, supra note 49, § 1.1, at 2-7. Unfortunately, most such statutes do not
require proof of financial responsibility until the driver has had one accident. Id.
150. FLA. STAT. § 324.011 (1991).
151. Ch. 29963, § 1, Laws of Fla. (1955) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 324.011 (1956)).
Although Personal Injury Protection coverage has been required throughout the
registration period since the No-Fault statute was enacted in 1971, property damage liability
was added to the required coverage in the motor vehicle insurance reform act of 1988.
Robert Henderson & Patrick F. Maroney, Motor Vehicle Insurance Reform: Revisiting the
Uninsured Driver, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 789, 790 (1988). Bodily injury liability coverage,
however, is still only required under the Financial Responsibility Law, and only after the first
accident as Florida Statutes section 324.011 states:
[T]he operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident or convicted of certain
traffic offenses meeting the operative provisions of s. 324.051(2) shall respond
for such damages and show proof of financial ability to respond for damages in
future accidents as a requisite to his future exercise of such privileges.
FLA. STAT. § 324.011 (1991) (emphasis added). Thus, in Florida, only the vehicles are
protected for liability from the time of registration. Injured persons are still only guaranteed
the minimum coverage afforded under PIP.
For an overview of the history and development of Florida's Financial Responsibility
Law see, FLORIDA LAW, supra note 90, §§ 1.5-1.8.
152. WIDNESS, supra note 49, § 1.1, at 4.
153. Mullis, 252 So. 2d at 237-38; see supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
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Florida's Financial Responsibility Law defines a motor vehicle as
[e]very self-propelled vehicle which is designed and required to be li-
censed for use upon a highway, including trailers and semitrailers de-
signed for use with such vehicles, except traction engines, road rollers,
farm tractors, power shovels, and well drillers, and every vehicle which
is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead wires but not
operated upon rails, but not including any bicycle or moped.1 54
The distinction between the PIP statute and Financial Responsibility
statute is readily apparent; PIP treats self-propelled vehicles separately,
whereas the Financial Responsibility Law incorporates self-propelled
vehicles into the definition of a motor vehicle. Thus, absent the four or
more wheels requirement of PIP, the two statutes are mutually exclusive in
their handling of motorcycles. If the PIP definition is used, motorcycles are
excluded. Conversely, when the Financial Responsibility statute is used,
motor vehicles include motorcycles.155
The courts have shown a preference for using the broader Financial
Responsibility Law definition to include motorcycles under UM cover-
age.'56 Relying on Standard Marine Insurance Co. v. Allyn, the Grant
court, likewise, applied the Financial Responsibility Law's definition. 157
In Allyn, the insured was a pedestrian who was severely injured when struck
by an uninsured motorcycle. 158  He filed a claim under his automobile
policy, which provided that the carrier would "pay all sums which the
insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as
damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile .. .,.
In defining an uninsured motor vehicle, the court stated:
We do not perceive that the legislature, by enacting the Florida
Automobile Reparations Reform Act, intended to exclude those motor
154. FLA. STAT. § 324.021(1) (1991) (emphasis added).
155. The inverse relationship between a policy provision and exclusion should be noted.
When the definition is applied to a coverage provision, the broader the definition, the more
coverage available. Conversely, as in Grant and Petersen, applying the definition to an
exclusion, the broader the definition the less coverage available.
156. See Carguillo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 529 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1988); State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Becraft, 501 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Allyn,
333 So. 2d at 497.
157. Grant, 620 So. 2d at 779.
158. Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 497.
159. Id. at 498. The term "uninsured automobile" was later changed to "uninsured
motor vehicle" by amendment. Id.
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vehicles enumerated above from the umbrella of uninsured motorists.
The statutory definition of a "motor vehicle" found in the Financial
Responsibility Act is far more consonant with the public policy of this
state as to uninsured motorist ....
The public policy described by the court was to provide the insured
recovery under his own policy for the same damages he would have been
entitled to recover had the tortfeasor maintained liability insurance. 161 The
court, therefore, held that the tortfeasor's uninsured motorcycle, which
struck the insured pedestrian, was an uninsured motor vehicle and the
insured could recover under his own UM coverage. 162  This logic was
clarified further by the supreme court in Carguillo v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. 1
63
As in Allyn, the Carguillo court was defining the tortfeasor's uninsured
vehicle. The insured was injured when struck by a motorcycle designed
mainly for off road use.' 64 The court reasoned that because the definition
of motor vehicle in the Financial Responsibility Law excluded vehicles
designed mainly for off road use, the tortfeasor would not have been
required to maintain liability coverage for his vehicle.'65 Because the
exclusion in the policy did not reduce the insured's coverage to a level
below that which was required by the Financial Responsibility Law, the
court upheld the exclusion and denied recovery to the insured.'66
160. Id. at 499 (emphasis added).
161. Id, (citing Davis v. United Fidelity & Guar. of Baltimore, Md., 172 So. 2d 485
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Gavin, 184 So. 2d 229 (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1966)).
162. Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 498.
163. 529 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1988).
164. Id. at 277.
165. Id. at 278 (citing Becraft, 501 So. 2d at 1316).
166. Id. Another doctrine for determining UM coverage bears discussion at this point.
Florida courts have interpreted this portion of the Mullis case to mean that UM coverage for
the injured party is based on whether or not the liability coverage of that particular policy
would cover him if he were the tortfeasor. See, e.g., Valiant Ins. Co. v. Webster, 567 So.
2d 408, 410 (Fla. 1990) (holding that the insured could not recover for the wrongful death
of his son, who was no longer a member of father's household, because son was not an
insured contemplated by Financial Responsibility Law, and because father sustained no bodily
injury as specified under the Financial Responsibility Law's minimum coverage requirement);
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Queen, 468 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (where
liability portion of the policy provided coverage for the daughter, who was a resident relative
of the insured, the UM section containing an owned-uninsured vehicle exclusion could not
preclude her recovery); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Bennet, 466 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); France v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 380 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
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(where definition of relative under liability portion of the policy excluded relatives who
owned their own automobile, daughter, who was injured while driving her own uninsured
auto, was not an insured under the liability provision and could not recover UM).
This "liability analysis" took on an additional wrinkle, however, when the supreme
court restated the Mullis doctrine:
[S]ince our decision in Mullis, the courts have consistently followed the principle
that if the liability portions of an insurance policy would be applicable to a
particular accident, the uninsured motorist provisions would likewise be
applicable; whereas, if the liability provisions did not apply to a given accident,
the uninsured motorist provisions of that policy would also not apply (except
with respect to occupants of the insured automobile).
Webster, 567 So. 2d at 410 (emphasis added).
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Shaw clarified the problem.
[AIII of these cases apply an analysis that focuses exclusively on the injured
individual rather than the accident; they rule simply and clearly that UM cover-
age is unavailable if liability coverage is inapplicable to a particular individual.
The majority, unsupported by case law, broadens the exclusion from the
'individual' to the 'accident' ....
Id. at 412 (Shaw, J., dissenting opinion).
The distinction between "individual" and "accident" has served to broaden the
exclusion, and thus narrow coverage. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 609 So.
2d 1385 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992). In Phillips, the insured's husband was injured while
riding his owned, uninsured motorcycle. Id at 1386. Nationwide asserted that the supreme
court overruled Mullis, sub silentio, by shifting the focus of the analysis from the individual
to the accident. Id. at 1387. The Nationwide policy provided liability coverage for "your
[the insured's] auto." "[Y]our auto" was defined as "the vehicle or vehicles described in the
... declarations." Id. at 1386. Thus, Nationwide asserted that because the motorcycle was
not listed in the declarations page, the accident would not have been covered under liability
if the insured's spouse had been the tortfeasor. Id. Although the husband was the spouse
of the named insured, and was covered under the liability section as an individual,
Nationwide asserted that the accident was not covered, and he was therefore precluded from
recovery under UM. Phillips, 609 So. 2d at 1388.
The Phillips court held that the restatement of the Mullis doctrine in Webster was
confusing and contradicted the repeated holding by Florida courts that UM applied to a Class
I insured "under whatever conditions, locations, or circumstances any of such insureds happen
to be in at the time . I..." ld. at 1388-89 (quoting Coleman v. Florida Ins. Guar. Ass'n Inc.,
517 So. 2d 686, 689 (Fla. 1988)). Moreover, the statement is contradicted by a later
reference in Webster to the Mullis opinion: "Mullis specifically holds that the statute
requires only that uninsured motorist coverage must be provided to those covered for
liability." Id. at 1389 (quoting Webster, 567 So. 2d at 411). The Phillips court therefore
held that the language in Webster, which defined UM coverage by the availability of liability
coverage for the accident, was non-binding dicta, and that the husband could recover under
UM. Id.
The Florida Supreme Court has granted certiorari and heard the Phillips case on
October 5, 1993, along with a companion case, Welker v. World Wide Underwriters Ins. Co.,
601 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992). Petitioner's Brief on Jurisdiction at 8, State
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Allyn and Carguillo are distinguishable from Grant and Petersen,
however, in that Allyn and Carguillo define the tortfeasor's vehicle. It is
logical to apply the Financial Responsibility Law when defining the
"offending motorist,"'7 whose fictitious insurance"' under that law UM
coverage is intended to parallel. The Grant and Petersen courts, however,
are not defining the tortfeasor's vehicle. Rather, they define the vehicle
occupied by the insured. Because there is no fictitious liability coverage
pertinent to the analysis in Grant and Petersen, the rationale for preferring
the Financial Responsibility Law definition over the No-Fault definition, the
public policy outlined in Allyn and Carguillo, is not applicable to Grant or
Petersen.
V. PETERSEN, GRANT AND POLICY CONSTRUCTION
In "My Fair Lady", Professor Higgins lamented, "Why Can't the
English Learn How to Speak?" On behalf of the insureds and their
attorneys, this plea may well be paraphrased to "Why Can't the
Companies Learn How to Write?" Why is it that so many of them
insist upon cluttering up their policies with braintesting definitions,
exclusions and conditions? . . .For years they have insisted upon
inserting ambiguity and repugnancy in their policies, to the constern-
ation of laymen and attorneys alike, all in face of the fact that when
they indulge in such practice, the courts invariably construe the policies
liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer.'69
Although Grant and Petersen effectively reach opposite results, the
reasoning of the courts are different. While the Grant court focused on the
public policy of UM and the Financial Responsibility Law outlined
above, 7° the Petersen court based its ruling on policy construction.
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Petersen, 615 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (No.
81,740). The court's opinion was not available as of this publication. This issue is raised
now to demonstrate the degree to which carriers have attempted to narrow the broad coverage
afforded under Mullis since it was decided.
167. Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 499.
168. Salas v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 272 So. 2d I (Fla. 1972) (Dekle, J., dissenting)
(in applying the reasoning that recovery should be as if the uninsured motorist had carried
an automobile liability policy, the court "fictitiously" "issues" a liability policy to the
tortfeasor).
169. Fontainbleau Hotel Corp. v. United Filigree Corp., 298 So. 2d 455, 458 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 303 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1974).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 160-66.
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As the quote above indicates, insurance contracts are the penultimate
contracts of adhesion. Because they are steeped in ambiguity and confusion,
Florida courts have adopted the rule of liberal construction in favor of the
insured, and strict construction against the insurer.' 7 ' If a policy is
ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of the insured.'72 This rule is
tempered, however, by requiring a "genuine inconsistency, uncertainty, or
ambiguity in meaning remain[ing] after resort to the ordinary rules of con-
struction" before the policy will be construed in favor of the insured.'73
A genuine ambiguity occurs when the terms of a policy are susceptible to
two reasonable constructions, and the interpretation which sustains coverage
for the insured will then be adopted.7 7 The rationale underlying this
principle is that the carrier, and not the insured, picks the language used.
75
171. Hartnett v. Southern Ins. Co., 181 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1965); see also Nixon v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 290 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1973) (where contractor, sued for defect in
wall which collapsed killing a child, could recover under policy despite exclusion precluding
recovery for completed products); Kirsch v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 598 So. 2d 109 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App.) (terms of an exclusion in insurance policy are to be narrowly construed
and uncertainties resolved in favor of coverage), review denied, 613 So. 2d I (Fla. 1992);
Swindal v. Prudential Property & Casualty Co., 599 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (exclusion of liability for intentional acts in homeowner's policy construed narrowly
allowing indemnity to insured who shot the plaintiff); Tire Kingdom Inc. v. First Southern
Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (inconsistencies in policy required
adopting construction that afforded coverage under commercial policy for claim of unfair
trade practices made against insured), review denied, 589 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1991); Tropical
Park Inc. v. United Stated Fidelity & Guar. Co., 357 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (terms of policy susceptible to two reasonable constructions, interpretation which
sustains coverage for the insured will be adopted); Fontainbleau Hotel, 298 So. 2d at 455
(under contractor's liability policy having two interpretations, court adopted interpretation
which sustained claim for building collapse caused by contractor's negligence).
172. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981) (interpretation of
contract against the draftsman); BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK
ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 1.01, at 3-8 (5th ed. 1992).
173. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 498 So. 2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 1986);
see also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 172, § 1.02, at 8-10.
174. See, e.g., Tire Kingdom, 573 So. 2d at 885; accord Tropical Park, 357 So. 2d at
253; Fontainbleau Hotel, 298 So. 2d at 455; Feldman v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha,
279 So. 2d 897, 898 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973); see also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra
note 172, § 1.03[b], at 12-13.
175. See, e.g., TropicalPark, 357 So. 2d at 256; Nixon, 290 So. 2d at 29; Hartnett, 181
So. 2d at 525. In Hartnett, the supreme court stated:
There is no reason why such policies cannot be phrased so that the average
person can clearly understand what he is buying. And so long as these contracts
are drawn in such a manner that it requires the proverbial Philadelphia lawyer
to comprehend the terms embodied in it, the courts should and will construe
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In Petersen, State Farm asserted that because the term "motor vehicle"
was not defined in the definitions section of the policy, and did not appear
in "bold italics" as other defined terms did, it was an undefined term in the
UM section and must be afforded its plain meaning.'76 It proposed that
the definition of the term "motor vehicle," which appeared in the No-Fault
section, did not apply to the UM section.'77 This assertion, however, is
contrary to Florida law which states that "[e]very insurance contract shall
be construed according to the entirety of its terms and conditions as set forth
in the policy and as amplified, extended, or modified by any application
therefore or any rider or endorsement thereto."'78 If an application must
be incorporated into the terms of a policy, so must a definition that appears
on the face of it.'" 9 The only definition for the term "motor vehicle" ap-
them liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer to protect
the buying public who rely upon the companies and agencies in such transac-
tions.
Hartnett, 181 So. 2d at 528; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt.
b, (1981) (rationale for interpretation of a contract against the drafter).
It should also be noted that State Farm could have avoided this problem altogether in
one of two ways: (1) it could have adopted the wording of Florida's Statutes section
627.727(9)(d) which phrases the exclusion:
The uninsured motorist coverage provided by the policy does not apply to the
named insured or family members residing within his household who are injured
while occupying any vehicle owned by such insureds for which uninsured
motorist coverage was not purchased.
FLA. STAT. § 627.727(9)(d) (1991) (emphasis added); or (2) it could have merely supplied
another definition of "motor vehicle" in the UM section of the policy.
176. Appellee's Brief at 19, Petersen (No. 92-01828).
177. Id.
178. FLA. STAT. § 627.419 (1991) (emphasis added); see also Associated Elec. & Gas
Ins. Servs. v. Houston Oil & Gas Co., 552 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(allowing insured to recover under Completed Operations Hazard clause of commercial policy
for damages caused by explosion occurring off the insured premises); Ellenwood v. Southern
United Life Ins. Co., 373 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (refusing to read clause
in life insurance policy separately from the two sentences preceding it, when all read together
provided coverage, and the sentence read separately excluded coverage); Feldman v. Central
Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 279 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (construing health
insurance policy as covering hospitalization after termination of the policy, where policy
language provided for all hospitalizations resulting from an accident, and hospitalization was
caused by injuries sustained in accident which predated termination of the policy).
179. See Dorrel v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 221 So. 2d 5, 6 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1969) (holding that definitions given in the policy must be followed when interpreting
automobile insurance policies); accord Valdes v. Prudence Mut. Casualty Co., 207 So. 2d
312, 314 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (in holding that a motor scooter is not an "automo-
bile" for an owned-uninsured vehicle exclusion, the court stated "this case could and should
1993]
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peared in the PIP section of the policy. 8' Therefore, when construing the
State Farm policy "according to the entirety of its terms,"'' the exclusion
must incorporate the definition provided in the policy, which excludes
motorcycles. Because Petersen was driving a motorcycle, his vehicle was
not excluded, and he was, therefore, covered when the accident oc-
curred.8 2
Even if State Farm can persuade the court that a motorcycle is
excluded by applying the Financial Responsibility Law's definition, State
Farm must still fail. By writing a definition into the policy which contrasted
with the definition applied to the exclusion, State Farm created ambiguity
in the policy. The policy is susceptible to two opposite interpretations; one
affording coverage, and the other precluding coverage. This "genuine
ambiguity '83 must be resolved in favor of the insured.
84
The Petersen court correctly applied Florida's rules of construction in
finding coverage for the insured. The Grant court reached different results,
however, not by applying the plain meaning of the term as urged by State
Farm; rather, by adopting the Financial Responsibility Law's definition and
relying on the precedent of Allyn and Carguillo.'85
Allyn dealt with a similar policy construction issue of whether the court
should look to a statutory definition in favor of one provided by the
policy. 86  As in Grant and Petersen, the Allyn policy had a No-Fault
section which defined a motor vehicle as one with four or more wheels.8 7
Ironically, the insurer made the same argument the plaintiffs now propose.
In recalling the rule that the court must apply the policy definitions when
construing its terms, 8 Standard Marine asserted that the court should
apply the policy definition under the PIP section to the motor vehicle driven
by the uninsured tortfeasor.8 9 Standard Marine asserted that because the
be decided by reference to the words and definitions used by the defendant itself in the
policy." (quoting Westerhausen v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 140 N.W.2d 719 (1966))); see also
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 172, § 1.01, at 3.
180. Petersen, 615 So. 2d at 182.
181. FLA. STAT. § 627.419 (1991).
182. Peterson, 615 So. 2d at 182.
183. See supra text accompanying note 173.
184. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
186. See Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 498-99.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 499 (citing Dorrel, 221 So. 2d at 5).
189. Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 499. As in Peterson and Grant, the PIP definition in the
Standard Marine policy was based upon the No-Fault law which required the vehicle to have
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tortfeasor was driving a motorcycle, his vehicle was not an uninsured motor
vehicle under the policy definition, and the claimant, who was a Class I
insured, was precluded from recovering UM coverage.' 90
The Allyn court, however, held that the definition in a policy may be
applied where the definition given is applicable to the coverage assumed, if
not contrary to statutory limitations and requirements.' 9' "It is well settled
in this State that where a contract of insurance is entered into on a matter
surrounded by statutory limitations and requirements, the parties are
presumed to have entered into such agreement with reference to the statute,
and the statutory provisions become part of the contract. .... In
recalling the public policy of the UM statute,' 93 the Allyn court reasoned
that applying the policy definition in this instance would impermissibly
provide the insured with less coverage than required by the statute., 94
Thus, the policy definition was supplanted with the Financial Responsibility
definition in order to afford the insured the minimum coverage required by
the UM statute.' 9"
Although the public policy of the UM statute overrode the words of the
policy in Allyn, no such public policy exists in Grant and Petersen.
Because Grant and Petersen are not defining the tortfeasor's motor vehicle,
using the State Farm policy definition of "motor vehicle" will not provide
the insured less coverage than intended by the statute. Although a carrier
may not afford less coverage than outlined in the statute, it can provide
more.'96 Because the Grant court had no reason to construe the policy
four or more wheels. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. (citing Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Gavin, 184 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1966), cert. dismissed, 196 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1967)).
192. Gavin, 184 So. 2d at 232 (citation omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 178-79 (1981).
193. The UM statute is intended to provided an insured with the same coverage he
would have been entitled to recover had the tortfeasor carried liability insurance. Allyn, 333
So. 2d at 499; see supra text accompanying note 161.
194. Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 499.
195. Id.
196. This is so because the statutes outline the minimum coverage required, not the
maximum. See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 574 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1990)
(policy language allowed recovery even though tortfeasor's liability coverage exceeded
insured's UM limits and under Florida Statutes section 627.727, insured would not have been
able to recover); see also Newton v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 560 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. Ist Dist.
Ct. App.) (allowing insured recovery under UM policy even though insured's injuries did not
meet the statutory injury threshold required to pursue a claim for non-economic damages
against the tortfeasor), review denied, 574 So. 2d 139 (Fla.), review denied sub nom.
1993]
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differently from the way it was written, its holding erroneously relied on
precedent and public policy that did not apply to the facts of the case.
Moreover, Florida's courts generally treat coverage clauses differently
from exclusions, such that exclusionary clauses are construed more strictly
than coverage clauses.'97 Yet the Grant court applied the rationale from
cases which construed coverage in order to broaden an exclusion. The
distinction between coverage clauses and exclusions was clarified in Salas
v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,198 when the supreme court stated
"the use of the language utilized in the argument under consideration ...
indicates that the phraseology was intended to create greater liability
coverage, not to create exemptions."' 99 The supreme court rejected the
carrier's attempt to apply case law which broadened coverage to exclusions
which decreased it.2"' The Grant court's reliance on case law which
broadens coverage for the insured, therefore, is misplaced when construing
an exclusion.
Thus, the Grant court's application of the Financial Responsibility
Law's definition is in error for two reasons. First, the public policy the
court relied upon does not apply to the facts of the case. Second, the court
applied case law that construes coverage broadly, in order to broaden an
exclusion, which, according to Florida's rules of construction, are to be
narrowly construed.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Petersen court correctly applied Florida's rules of policy
construction, the Grant court relied on public policy that does not apply, and
precedent that may not be controlling, in order to construe the State Farm
policy as precluding coverage to the insured. The Florida Supreme Court
could resolve the conflict between Petersen and Grant on narrow grounds
by ruling on the policy construction issue only. However, such a narrow
International Bankers Co. v. Newton, 574 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1990).
197. Triano v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 565 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1990); accord Wallach v. Rosenberg, 527 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 536 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1988); see also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 172, §
1.03[b][1], at 12.
198. 272 So. 2d I (Fla. 1973).
199. Id. at 4.
200. Id. at 5 (holding that language of Mullis, which provided that the public policy of
UM is to provide the minimum limits of automobile liability policy, could not be applied to
household member exclusion).
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ruling will not address the position of Mullis as precedent under the current
version of the statute which allows selective nonstacking; would not resolve
the effect of the 1987 amendment to the UM statute on UM's relationship
to the Financial Responsibility Law and PIP Law; and would shed no
further light on the position of a motorcycle under Florida insurance law.
This comment has illustrated that in most insurance cases, the motorcy-
clist does riot recover for his injuries; either because the courts define a
motorcycle as a motor vehicle when such definition precludes recovery by
policy exclusion, or because the Legislature excluded motorcycles from the
definition of motor vehicle under the No-Fault Law. Uninsured motorist
coverage, therefore, has usually been the only recovery available to the
motorcyclist in the wake of catastrophic collisions and devastating injuries.
Uninsured motorist coverage, however, is rapidly disappearing as the safety
net for the motorcyclist.
Although motorcyclists can purchase UM coverage for a motorcycle,
most insureds do not understand the nature of this coverage or its impor-
tance.2' Moreover, many insureds are not fully informed by their carriers
of the availability of UM coverage for motorcycles, or are intentionally mis-
lead.2" 2 The Grant and Petersen cases illustrate the degree to which UM
carriers have tried to narrow the coverage afforded under UM, and to
"whittle away" at the broad holding of Mullis.
Given motorcycles' propensity for injury and damage, Florida's
Legislature should consider providing more coverage for their victims rather
than less. The public funds contribution to care for injured motorcyclists
has been estimated at between 63.4 and 82.3 percent of total expenses.2 3
The Legislature must consider the public cost of treating the injured
201. See Karen E. Roselli, Comment, Florida Statute Section 627.727: Is the Statutory
Right to Reject Uninsured Motorist Coverage Really a "Right" At All?, 8 NOVA L. REV. 145,
145-46 (1983).
202. See, e.g., Davis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 395 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1981) (insured asserted that his agent told him UM was not available for
motorcycles); cf Wilson v. National Indem. Co., 302 So. 2d 141 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1974) (insured was told by agent that she did not need UM because it duplicated medical
coverage she already had as member of the armed forces).
203. Motorcycle Trauma, supra note 8, at 222 (studying the costs of motorcycle trauma
in Seattle, Washington); see also Timothy Bray, M.D. et al. Cost of Orthopedic Injuries
Sustained in Motorcycle Accidents, 254 JAMA 2452 (1985) (studying the costs of motorcycle
trauma at the University of California, Davis, Medical Center in Sacramento, California).
The average cost per patient in the Seattle study group was estimated at $25,764.00 in 1988.
Motorcycle Trauma, supra note 8, at 222. Factoring in the rising cost of health care, the per
patient cost is much higher today.
1993]
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motorcyclist, caring for his or her family during a long period of convales-
cence, and supporting the family of a motorcyclist permanently if he or she
dies.2" 4 Thus, the underlying argument for failing to require coverage for
motorcyclists, that they assume the inherent risk of riding these vehicles,
falls flat when Florida's citizens assume the cost.
Although the optimum solution, both for motorcyclists and for all
Florida motorists, would be mandated bodily injury liability coverage for all
drivers," 5  Florida's Legislature has been reluctant to do this.20 6 In the
alternative, the Legislature could mandate UM coverage as a prerequisite for
all motorcycle registrations, and thus require drivers who wish to assume the
inherent risk of driving these vehicles to also assume the insurance cost of
their protection. Although this seems a paternalistic solution, it would shift
the financial burden of caring for the injured motorcyclist from the taxpayer.
It would also ensure recompense for motorcyclists who face a much higher
risk of death and severe injury and who, in Florida, will more likely than
not, be struck by an uninsured driver.20 7
DENISE TAMIR
204. See Motorcycle Trauma, supra note 8, at 222-23. A Massachusetts court summed
up the problem:
We cannot agree that the consequences of such (motorcycle) injuries are limited
to the individual who sustains the injury. From the moment of injury, society
picks the person up off the highway; delivers him to a municipal hospital and
municipal doctors; provides him with unemployment compensation, if after
recovery, he cannot replace his lost job, and, if the injury causes permanent
disability, may assume the responsibility for his and his family's subsistence.
Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277, 279 (D. Mass), affirmed, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972).
205. This would decrease the number of uninsured drivers on Florida's roads, and
accordingly, reduce the risk of non-compensable injuries.
206. Surprisingly, it is the insurance industry that has lobbied against such required
coverage. See Henderson & Moroney, supra note 151, at 802.
207. See id. at 792.
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Exhibit A
BROWARD ALL CRASHES FATAL CRASHES INJURY CRASHES
COUNTY # 9 # %
PASSENGER
VEHICLES 34,933 195 
.56 22,984 65.79
MOTORCYCLES 538 11 
2.04 485 90.15
PALM BEACH ALL CRASHES 
FATAL CRASHES INJURY 
CRASHES
COUNTY 
PASSENGER
VEHICLES 19,935 
152 .76 13,202 
66.23
MOTORCYCLES 
311 8 2.57 
269 86.50
#= The number of all crashes which resulted in a 
fatality or injury.
%=The percentage of all crashes which resulted 
in a fatality or
Source: Florida Department of Highway Safety and 
Motor Vehicles, crash
records.
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